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ABSTRACT The 2012 Constituency Commission report has recommended a reduction in the
number of Da´il deputies from 166 to 158 and the number of general election constituencies
from 43 to 40, while bringing about changes – some very fundamental in scope – to the
majority of the existing Da´il constituencies. These changes are detailed in this article, while
being placed in the context of previous electoral boundary amendments throughout the
history of the Irish state and the processes employed in other states, such as the United
Kingdom. The oft quoted contention that the 2012 boundary revisions are the most consider-
able in scope since those of 1980 is tested and proven with reference to the use of the Kavanagh
index of constituency change (KICC scores), with these KICC scores also employed to high-
light the regions and constituencies that have been most prone to boundary amendments
over the past three decades.
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Introduction
The 2012 Constituency Commission report, recommending new constituency bound-
aries for the next Da´il (general) elections, ultimately marks the effective start of a long
campaign leading up to the next election. Differential levels of population change
across the state between 1996 and 2006 (as measured in the 2002 and 2006
Census reports) had proved to be the main driver of boundary changes in the previous
two (2004 and 2007) reports. However, while population change again played a key
role in shaping the changes made in the 2012 report, the main impulse for change
related more so to the government’s decision to reduce the number of seats in Da´il
E´ireann. The changes recommended in this report are of course of great interest to
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the different political parties and individual politicians for whom a boundary change
might greatly affect their future electoral prospects, even to the point of effectively
ending their Da´il careers. The report is also likely to have a particular bearing on
the areas involved and their representation levels, as well as levels of political engage-
ment and participation in such areas. These could also have an impact on the extent to
which certain political reform initiatives such as gender quotas are effectively
implemented.
The Irish Electoral Boundary Redrawal Process in Context
Changes to electoral boundaries in Ireland prior to the 1977 election were generally
made along partisan lines (with Fianna Fa´il dominating this process owing to the fact
that this party generally formed the government for much of the period between the
early 1930s and the 1970s). The main trend evident in the earlier boundary amend-
ments involved a reduction in district magnitude levels (Figure 1). The 1923 revision
involved an average district magnitude level of 5.25 seats per constituency and
encompassed a number of large (seven-, eight- and nine-seat) constituencies. But sub-
sequent revisions saw the extinction of these and brought about an increase in the
number of three-seat constituencies (the smallest constituency size permitted under
the Irish constitution). The number of three-seat constituencies increased from six
in 1923 to 26 in the partisan revisions of 1969 and 1974, before falling again once
independent commissions took charge of the process from 1980 onwards. Such
changes favoured the two larger parties, Fianna Fa´il and Fine Gael, as these parties
would be expected to gain electorally, especially relative to the smaller parties,
from the larger number of smaller (three-seat) constituencies, in which the share of
Figure 1. Average seat levels per constituency by Da´il boundary revision, 1923–2012
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the vote required to win seats would be higher than in larger constituencies and
beyond the reach of the smaller political groupings in most cases. In the four elections
held after the 1933 revisions, Fianna Fa´il won 6.5 more seats than it would have if its
share of Da´il seats had been exactly proportional to the first preference votes won by
Fianna Fa´il in these contests (Coleman, 2007: 163).
Long periods between boundary revisions (with an average gap of 12 years
between revisions up to the late 1960s), differential levels of population decline
across the state (with particularly high levels in the west) and a degree of malappor-
tionment led to significant variations in average population per Da´il deputy levels
between different constituencies in the decades leading up to the 1960s (Central
Statistics Office, 1950, 1957). The more rural and western constituencies tended,
as a result, to be over-represented relative to those in Dublin and the east, with the
1956 Census showing the average population per Da´il deputy level in Dublin
(23,526 people per Da´il deputy) to be 19.3 per cent above the national average rep-
resentation level (19,716) and 34.5 per cent above the average level in the Connacht–
Ulster constituencies (17,490) (Central Statistics Office, 1957). A controversial
boundary revision introduced by the Fianna Fa´il government in 1959 proposed to
maintain this inbuilt bias in favour of western constituencies on the basis of a propo-
sal that constituency area should also be taken into account in the revision process.
But these proposals were later withdrawn after the constitutionality of this 1959
Act was successfully challenged in the High Court by Senator John O’Donovan on
the equality of representation principle established in relation to Da´il constituencies
by Article 16.2 of the Irish constitution.
The O’Donovan decision also prompted efforts to bring Da´il deputy per population
ratios more in line with the national average. The ‘micromanagement of constituency
boundaries’ that resulted was associated with increased attempts by government
parties to manipulate these constituency boundaries for their political advantage,
resulting in a significant increase in the breaching of county boundaries in the
process (Coakley, 2007: 9). The degree of bias produced by these gerrymanders
was also shaped by other considerations, such as changing party support or compe-
tition levels and vote transfer patterns, and some gerrymanders proved to be decid-
edly less successful. The successful gerrymander brought in by the Fianna Fa´il
Minister for Local Government Kevin Boland with the 1969 revisions (the ‘Bolan-
der’) helped his party to win a clear overall majority in the 1969 election even
though Fianna Fa´il’s vote share was lower than the combined vote share won by
the main opposition parties, Fine Gael and Labour. Fianna Fa´il’s success in that elec-
tion, however, was not solely down to the ‘Bolander’, but was also due to the weak-
ness of vote transfers between the main opposition parties and the especially large
number of Labour Party candidates contesting that election, many of whom won rela-
tively small vote levels. The effect of these revisions was decidedly blunted in the
subsequent 1973 contest by the opposition parties’ decision to fight that election
on a common platform, meaning that vote transfers between the two parties improved
as a result and this helped the coalition parties to win that election. The most contro-
versial (and ultimately least successful) of the gerrymanders was the 1974 boundary
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revisions brought in by the Minister for Local Government in the Fine Gael–Labour
coalition government, James Tully. These had been expected to bias the results of the
following general election significantly in favour of the coalition parties and
especially Labour, but an unanticipated large swing to Fianna Fa´il in the 1977
general election meant that the effect of the gerrymander actually worked in favour
of the opposition party. The spectacular failure of the Tully gerrymander left the
Fine Gael–Labour government liable to ‘go down in world history as probably the
only government ever to implement a gerrymander which favoured the opposition’
(Gallagher, 1986: 260) and gave rise to a new term in the political science literature,
the ‘Tullymander’. However, it did not prove an outright failure as it did succeed in
limiting Labour Party seat losses (albeit at the expense of that party’s coalition
partner, Fine Gael) in the 1977 election.
Promises were made by Fianna Fa´il during the 1977 campaign to put an indepen-
dent body in charge of future constituency boundary revisions, and these were
implemented after the Lynch government regained power at that election. These inde-
pendent commissions were initially established on an ad hoc basis, starting with the
1980 boundary revisions. The 1997 Electoral Act placed these independent commis-
sions on a statutory basis as a permanent Constituency Commission, to be chaired by
a Judge of the High Court, and whose membership would also consist of the Ombuds-
man, the Secretary General of the Department of Environment and Local Govern-
ment, the Clerk of Da´il E´ireann and the Clerk of Seanad E´ireann. The frequency
of constituency boundary revisions has increased dramatically since the establish-
ment of the independent commissions, with nine boundary reports produced over
the three following decades, commencing with the 1980 report (although the 1988
report was never implemented due to opposition party protests against the amending
of the terms of reference for the 1988 commission to more or less eliminate five-seat
constituencies), as compared with a total of just six reports across the period 1923–
1980.
The 2012 Constituency Commission Report
The changed context faced by the 2011/12 Constituency Commission was shaped by
a government decision to reduce Da´il seat numbers, but also by a High Court chal-
lenge taken by independent Da´il deputies Finian McGrath and Catherine Murphy
against the constitutionality of the constituency boundaries used for the 2007
general election. Drawn up in the 2004 Constituency Commission report, these
were based on 2002 Census population by area figures, but a new census (the
2006 Census) had already taken place in the intervening period and provisional
Census 2006 population by area figures had been made available some months
before the general election took place (with definitive census figures released two
months before this on 29 March 2007). These figures outlined significant variations
in terms of Da´il deputy per population ratios across constituencies. The three-seat
Dublin West constituency (92,900) was found to have a larger population than the
four-seat Cork North-Central (91,591), while four-seat Dublin North (120,309) had
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a larger population than a number of five-seat constituencies (Cavan-Monaghan
(120,000), Dublin South (118,704), Limerick East (118,235) and Du´n Laoghaire
(114,166)), with the populations of these being significantly lower than that of the
largest five-seat constituency, Laois-Offaly (137,927) (Central Statistics Office,
2007: 39). The High Court rejected the claims, arguing that it was ‘not practicable
between the publication of the final (census) figures on March 29th and when the
Da´il was dissolved (April 29th) to ensure the process of amending legislation was
completed in time for the general election’ (Carolan, 2007: 7).
The judgment, however, argued for a change in the process of redrawing electoral
boundaries. Noting the limited differences between provisional and definitive popu-
lation census figures for large geographical units such as Da´il constituencies, the
judgment argued that the process of establishing a Constituency Commission
should commence after the publication of provisional population by area census
figures (usually released a few months after the holding of a census) with the
proviso that recommendations based on these be checked against the final population
by area figures before a new Constituency Commission report is published (Carty,
2007; Carolan, 2007). This finding was given a statutory basis as part of the 2009
Electoral (Amendment) Act and ensured that the process of redrawing electoral
boundaries based on the 2011 Census figures would commence at a much earlier
stage than that of previous revisions.
The other key development that would ultimately shape the 2011/12 Commis-
sion’s work was an announcement by the Fine Gael leader Enda Kenny at the
2009 MacGill Summer School that he was planning a reduction in Da´il seat
numbers should Fine Gael take power following the next election. He suggested
that, allowing for provisions to help preserve county boundaries and the need to
take account of new population figures at the following census, there was scope
for reduction in Da´il seat numbers of ‘somewhere in between 10 and 20’ (de
Bre´adu´n, 2009: 8). This was later interpreted by some commentators as a cast-iron
Fine Gael promise to reduce Da´il seat numbers by 20. But they failed to note that
the potential for seat reductions would be limited by any population increase at
Census 2011 given the constitutional provision for there to be one Da´il deputy for
no more than 30,000 people on average within the state.
The 2012 Constituency Commission, the fourth under the terms of the 1997 Elec-
toral Act, was established on 27 July 2011 after the publication of the provisional
Census 2011 population by area figures. The terms of reference for Da´il constituency
boundaries were set out in Section 6 of the Electoral Act and the various amendments
to this, including the 2011 amendment, which reduced the range of seat numbers that
the Commission could opt of from the old 164–168 seat range to a new range of
between 153 and 160 seats. As has been the case since the 1947 boundary revisions,
constituencies comprised of contiguous areas were to be represented by between
three and five Da´il deputies. The breaching of county boundaries, as far as would
be practicable, was to be avoided in the drawing of electoral boundaries, while due
regard was also to be taken of significant physical features and population density
levels The Commission was also required to try, as far as was practicable, to
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ensure continuity with the previous boundary configuration and to ensure that the
ratio between the number of TDs and population in constituencies was similar
across the state. The latter provision usually acts as the basis under which a Consti-
tuency Commission is required to make changes to existing electoral boundaries, and
indeed significant variations existed between the old Da´il constituencies in terms of
their population per Da´il deputy levels based on the Census 2011 figures, as illus-
trated by Figure 2.
In this revision, however, the requirement to reduce Da´il seat numbers by between
six and 13 was an even more significant factor in shaping the changes than that of
population change. Constituency Commissions generally attempt to ensure that the
deputy per population ratio for all the recommended constituencies fall within a 5
per cent range of the national average representation level. Derogations from this 5
per cent limit had been permitted in past reports up to a maximum variance of
7.89 per cent – a precedent set by the level of variance associated with the Mayo
East constituency in the 1983 Commission’s recommendations. Such instances
mainly involved cases where county boundaries would otherwise have been brea-
ched, as occurred in relation to the Louth and Cavan-Monaghan constituencies in
the 2004 revisions and Cavan-Monaghan again in the 2007 revisions.
In relation to population trends, the significant level of population growth associ-
ated with the Celtic Tiger period of economic growth in the periods leading up to the
1996 and 2002 Censuses was shown to have continued into the intercensal period
leading up to the 2011 Census, which showed that the state population had
reached 4,588,252, marking an increase of 348,084, or 8.1 per cent, on the 2006
figure. The somewhat unanticipated level of population increase meant that the
Fine Gael proposals to reduce Da´il seat numbers had to be tempered, as the
minimum number of deputies possible given the constitutional stipulation to have
at least one Da´il deputy per 30,000 population would now be 153, having been
142 following Census 2006. Notable geographical variations were evident across
the country in terms of this population change, with especially high levels of increase
again being evident in commuter belt counties such as Laois and Fingal and less
marked levels of increase found in other parts of the state, and this geography of
population change would feed into the decisions taken by the Commission.
The level of change associated with the present Constituency Commission report
was the most dramatic since the 1980 revision brought about an increase in Da´il seat
numbers from 148 to 166. The Commission decided to reduce Da´il seat numbers by
eight, while the number of Da´il constituencies was reduced from 43 to 40, with four
fewer three-seat constituencies and one more four-seat constituency increasing the
average number of seats per Da´il constituency to 3.95, a higher level than that associ-
ated with the 2004 and 2007 reports (Figure 1). Indeed, the number of four-seat con-
stituencies (16) recommended in the report is the largest ever number to be associated
with a boundary report in the history of the state. The decision taken by the Commis-
sion to opt for a total seat number level towards the top of the range available to them
attracted some criticism, but this could be defended on the basis that a lower number
would have brought the national average representation level very close to the 30,000
220 A. Kavanagh
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Figure 2. Population per Da´il deputy levels by constituency based on the definitive
Census 2011 population by area figures
Source: Central Statistics Office (2012).
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limit and could possibly have resulted in challenges as to the constitutionality of the
recommendations. It also allowed for some leeway in relation to the continuity pro-
vision, with the possibility of this number of seats being maintained in future Consti-
tuency Commission revisions even with some further degree of population increase
so long as the total state population does not exceed a level of 4.74 million.
Greater stress was placed on the equal representation provision in this report, as
compared with the provisions for avoiding the breach of county boundaries and for
ensuring continuity with previous Commission reports. Each report is shaped by
the differential weightings being applied by different commissions to the proportion-
ality, county boundary and continuity provisions within the terms of reference. While
the 1980 Commission placed a greater stress on matching constituency and county
boundaries and the continuity provision strongly shaped the recommendations of
the 2007 Commission, the 2012 report places much stronger emphasis on the propor-
tionality provision at the expense of the other two. None of the recommended consti-
tuencies fell outside the 5 per cent variance limit in terms of how their deputy per
population ratios compared with the national average of 29,040, with the
maximum levels of variance being associated with Dublin Mid-West (24.94%)
and the new five-seat Donegal constituency (+4.93%). If greater leeway had been
allowed for in relation to constituency deputy per population variances, some
breaches of county boundaries could have been avoided, or even mended, including
those involving the counties of Galway, Carlow, Meath, Westmeath and Kildare.
County boundary breaches involving Offaly, Limerick and Waterford, in addition
to the highly contentious political division of Leitrim, were redressed by this
report, but new county breaches were to ensue, involving the aforementioned
Galway and Kildare cases, as well as other new county boundary breaches involving
Tipperary, Mayo, Cavan and Donegal. The report also allowed for the political reuni-
fication of Swords Town. While the 2012 Commission appeared to be more tolerant
of breaches of county boundaries than previous commissions were, it did extend the
rules involving county boundaries to take account of boundaries between local auth-
ority areas in Dublin, which proved to be a significant factor in relation to the reshap-
ing of the old Dublin South constituency boundary. The decision to match the
constituency boundary between the old Dublin South and Dublin South-West consti-
tuencies with that of the local authority boundary between the South Dublin and Du´n
Laoghaire-Rathdown counties resulted in the transfer of an area equivalent to a popu-
lation of 39,311, as well as a Da´il seat, from Dublin South to Dublin South-West. The
local authority boundary stipulation did not apply as rigorously in other parts of the
Dublin region, with a new breach emerging involving the local authority boundaries
of Fingal and Dublin City with the transfer of the Ashtown and Phoenix Park areas
out of Dublin Central into Dublin West.
In addition to changes effecting the old Dublin South constituency, the creation of
five-seat county constituencies for Tipperary, Donegal and Kerry (with these counties
previously having been divided into two three-seat constituencies) were among some
of the more dramatic changes associated with this report, with territory in north Tip-
perary and south Donegal also being moved into other neighbouring constituencies in
222 A. Kavanagh
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order to reduce the population levels of these constituency areas sufficiently for these
to become five-seat constituencies. The other new constituency to be created was the
five-seat Dublin Bay North constituency, largely comprised of an amalgamation of
the old three-seat Dublin North-East and Dublin North-Central constituencies, but
with some territory being ceded (Portmarnock and Baldoyle) to the Dublin Fingal
constituency. Despite the overall reduction in Da´il seat numbers, some constituencies
gained seats, including the Dublin Fingal (formerly Dublin North) and Dublin South-
West constituencies, as well as the old five-seat Laois-Offaly constituency, which
was now to be divided into two new three-seat constituencies, Laois and Offaly.
Laois-Offaly had been the only constituency to remain with the same boundaries
and seat numbers across all boundary revisions from 1923 to 2007. High levels of
population growth in this constituency (and especially in Laois) in the 2000s,
however, meant that this constituency ceded some territory to Tipperary North in
the 2007 revisions and ceased to exist with the 2012 report. The old three-seat
Sligo-North Leitrim constituency also effectively gained a seat, as well as the remain-
der of Leitrim county and additional territory in Donegal and Cavan counties.
Political Impacts of the Boundary Changes
The creation of new election boundaries for the next general election has fundamen-
tally altered the rules of the electoral game and sets in play the stage on which the next
election campaign will be fought. The base levels of support for different political
parties by constituency have been changed, as areas of strong party support are
moved into, or out of, different constituencies. Furthermore, changes in seat allo-
cations for constituencies can improve, or reduce, a party’s prospects of winning
seats in that constituency relative to their support levels in that area. The added
dimension of a reduction in the overall Da´il seat levels by eight adds a further
potent dimension to the political melting pot, as this ensures that some incumbents
are certain to lose their seats at the next general election unless political retirements
make up for the shortfall. Looking at the impact of these changes, analyses by
Donnelly (2012) and Kavanagh (2012), although differing somewhat in their
approaches, both suggested that the extent of Fianna Fa´il losses in the 2011 election
would have been tempered somewhat had these changes been in place for that elec-
tion, while the level of gains by the Labour Party and independents would not have
been as dramatic. Unlike the Donnelly analysis, which exclusively used figures for
the old constituency units, the Kavanagh (2012) analysis was based on amended con-
stituency support figures, taking account of party support level changes arising from
movements of territory in and out of constituencies in cases where tally figures are
readily available. This analysis estimated that the final party seat levels in the 2011
general election, had the 2012 Constituency Commission report general election
boundaries been employed, would have been (the actual seat levels are in parenth-
eses): Fine Gael 74 (76), Labour Party 34 (37), Fianna Fa´il 22 (20), Sinn Fe´in 12
(14), Green Party 0 (0), Independents and Others 16 (19).
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While parties will be affected by constituency changes, individual candidates are
more likely to be affected as candidates’ electoral prospects may be altered signifi-
cantly by decisions to increase, or reduce, the numbers of seats in those constituencies
as well as the transfer in of new territory from neighbouring constituencies or the
transfer out of constituency territory to other neighbouring constituencies. The gain
of a seat means that smaller parties have a better chance of winning, or holding,
seats at general election contests (although not to the same degree in local elections
where candidate factors tend to hold greater weight than party-based voting does), as
the addition of an extra seat acts to reduce the percentage share of the vote required to
reach the quota in that constituency. On the other hand, the loss of a seat increases the
percentage share of the vote required to reach the quota and can make it more difficult
for the smaller parties to translate their support levels into seat gains – for instance the
loss of two seats involving the new Dublin Rathdown constituency increased the
share of the vote required to reach the quota here from 1623 to 25 per cent. The loss
of a seat by a constituency also means that at least one of the incumbents is certain
to lose their seat and significantly increases competition levels, almost to the point
of making these ‘group of death’-type constituencies. The ‘last one in’ in the previous
election, that is, the last candidate who was deemed elected in the election contest in
that constituency, may well be viewed as being especially vulnerable in these cases
(as indeed proved to be the case with Ciara´n Cuffe of the Green Party in Du´n Lao-
ghaire in the 2011 election), although it is by no means the case that these candidates
will be the ones to lose the seat. For instance, in 2007 Fine Gael’s Kieran O’Donnell
took the last seat in the Limerick East constituency, and that constituency lost a seat in
the subsequent boundary revisions (and was renamed Limerick City). However,
instead of being the one to lose out in the following general election, the extent of
the swing to Fine Gael (and from Fianna Fa´il) at this contest meant that O’Donnell
comfortably retained his seat and the seat was instead lost by Fianna Fa´il’s Peter
Power. By contrast, the gain of a seat could possibly make the task of defending a
seat at an election decidedly easier. Indeed, despite the level of volatility associated
with the 2011 election, the two constituencies that gained extra seats in the 2007 revi-
sions – Dublin West and Louth – were among a small number of constituencies in
which none of the outgoing deputies lost their seats. Dublin West was the only con-
stituency to return all the deputies – Joan Burton (Labour), Leo Varadkar (Fine Gael)
and the late Brian Lenihan (Fianna Fa´il) – who were elected for that constituency in
the previous election (2007), with Joe Higgins (Socialist Party) taking the extra seat in
that constituency.
Boundary changes also have an impact on candidate prospects when territory trans-
fers are involved. This links in with the concept of the ‘friends and neighbours effect’.
This argues that a candidate will generally tend to win a significantly larger share of
the first preference vote in those areas located in, and close to, that candidate’s local
base within that constituency, with the candidate’s vote share declining the further
one moves from the candidate’s local base as tantamount to a distance-decay effect
(Parker, 1982). Boundary changes that involve the loss of territory by a constituency
including part of a candidate’s local base will, as a result, significantly reduce that
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candidate’s potential vote and possibly have the effect of undermining their prospects
of winning a Da´il seat in that constituency. By contrast, a transfer of territory into a
constituency that is located close to a candidate’s base within that constituency could
have the effect of substantially improving their electoral prospects. Territory losses by
constituencies arising from the 2012 boundary revisions are likely to see local support
being lost by a number of candidates in those constituencies. For instance, the loss of
territory by the Mayo constituency to neighbouring Galway West (also resulting in a
loss of a seat by Mayo) involves the moving out of an area where the Taoiseach Enda
Kenny won over 1,200 votes in the 2011 election, Minister of State Michael Ring
won over 1,800 votes and their Fine Gael running mate, John O’Mahony, won
nearly 1,000 first preference votes. By contrast, while Fine Gael candidates in
Mayo would be losing out on roughly 4,000 of the first preference votes won by
them in the 2011 election, this boundary change would be expected to favour Fine
Gael candidates in Galway West, such as Sea´n Kyne, whose political bases would
be located close to the area that is being moved in from Mayo.
The changes associated with the 2012 report will also be of interest in terms of their
impacts on the implementation of recently introduced gender quota legislation. The
overall reduction in the total number of seats means that any increased number of
female candidates will ultimately be vying for a smaller number of Da´il seats. In
light of the Constituency Commission changes, parties may feel the need to reduce can-
didate numbers at the next election, but on the other hand gender quota provisions may
well require these parties to run a significantly higher number of female candidates, in
the process acting to increase parties’ overall candidate numbers. Some hard decisions
are being posed for a number of the political parties, but especially Fine Gael as that
party won 76 seats at the 2011 election, with 65 of these won by male candidates. If
all Fine Gael’s male incumbents were to contest the next election (excluding Sean
Barrett, the Ceann Comhairle), the party would need to run at least 28 female candidates
(up from 16 in 2011) in order not to breach the gender quota legislation. The number of
female candidates would have to increase further in line with the selection of male aspir-
ants, or non-incumbents. Indeed, if Fine Gael were to run the same number of male can-
didates (88) as the party did in 2011, then they would have to run 38 female candidates,
amounting to an increase of 22 (a 21.2 per cent increase) in that party’s total number of
candidates relative to the number contesting the 2011 election. Ultimately, the choices
left open to parties are to run significantly fewer male candidates (which might require
the deselection of male incumbents in some cases) in order to reduce overall candidate
levels in light of the Constituency Commission changes or to run an increased number
of candidates to absorb the associated increase in female candidate levels. The latter
scenario may not be one that the political parties favour, but it is worth noting recent
cases where parties have managed to gain or retain seats despite apparently ‘running
too many candidates’, such as Fine Gael in Galway East (2007, 2011), Labour in
Galway East (2011), the Progressive Democrats in Galway West (2002, 2007) and
Fianna Fa´il in Laois-Offaly in 2011 (the party did lose a seat in this latter case, but
the decision to run three candidates instead of two was instrumental in Fianna Fa´il
holding two seats in that constituency despite the collapse in Fianna Fa´il support
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nationally). If parties were instead to choose to reduce their overall candidate levels in
light of the overall reduction in Da´il seat numbers, these parties would be required to
reduce significantly their number of male candidates either by blocking the candidatures
of male aspirants or possibly by means of the deselection of male incumbents. This, in
turn, could lead to a significant increase in the number of gene pool independents at the
next election, as disaffected male candidates, who feel they have been unfairly blocked
at party selection conventions as a result of the gender quota, may opt to run as inde-
pendent candidates and could ultimately go on to defeat the official female party can-
didate in the general election contest, especially if the political context of the next
general election is favourable towards independent candidates.
On the other hand, there is a higher percentage vote for females in larger consti-
tuencies; female candidates are more likely to make electoral breakthroughs in
these, as evidenced from the 2009 local elections, as the data in Table 1 illustrate.
The main driver here is the fact that parties are increasingly more likely to select
female candidates in the larger constituencies. On this basis, the slight increase
in the average constituency size arising from the 2012 Constituency Commission
report may make it easier for parties to implement gender quotas, especially in
certain constituencies. New opportunities for female candidates to compete
successfully for seats may open up in the newly enlarged (amalgamated) constitu-
encies (such as Dublin Bay North, Donegal, Kerry and Tipperary) or in constitu-
encies that effectively gained seats in these boundary redrawals (such as Offaly,
Sligo-Leitrim and Dublin Fingal). Evidence from the last local elections showed
instances where new female candidates were able to emerge with significant
levels of success in local electoral areas that had gained seats, as indeed was the
case with the three Dublin Inner City constituencies. Against that, the loss of
seats by certain constituencies (such as Dublin Rathdown (the old Dublin South)
and Dublin South Central) will pose significant challenges for female aspirants
and female incumbents (as indeed for male aspirants and incumbents) contesting
these constituencies.
Table 1. Votes/seats won by female candidates in the 2009 local elections (town, county and
city council elections) by constituency size
3/4
Seats
5
Seats
6/7
Seats
9/12
Seats
Female candidates (%) 16.9 17.3 17.3 22.7
Female candidates (%) – political parties 18.8 18.9 20.2 25.2
Female candidates (%) – Fianna Fa´il/Fine Gael 15.2 17.7 18.7 26.9
Votes won by female candidates (%) 16.7 16.8 17.3 20.4
Seats won by female candidates (%) 14.7 15.5 18.2 21.7
First-time female councillors as related to total
numbers elected (%)
5.5 4.5 6.5 9.5
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Measuring Levels of Constituency Boundary Change
Many commentators, including this author, have spoken of the 2012 revisions as
amounting to the most dramatic changes to general election boundaries in the Repub-
lic of Ireland since the 1980 revisions. But can the constituency change level figures
for the last eight such revisions be employed to test this contention and can such an
analysis pinpoint those constituencies, or areas, which have been especially suscep-
tible to boundary revisions over the past three decades? To be able to answer these
questions requires the development of a measure or an index to be able to compare
the levels of change involved in different boundary revisions. Such a measure has
been devised for the purpose of studying boundary revisions in the United
Kingdom by Rallings and Thrasher (2007), with this index of change being used
to show that the level of boundary amendment proposed in the 2012 UK Boundary
Commissions reports far outstripped those of the previous such revision (Rossiter
et al., 2012). Given the different nature of the United Kingdom’s electoral system,
but most notably the use of single-seat constituencies as opposed to the multiple-
seat constituencies used in the Irish context, this index of change is not readily appli-
cable to Ireland.
In light of this, I have developed an Irish-specific index of change. The Kavanagh
index of constituency change (KICC) produces KICC scores for each boundary revi-
sion, as well as for specific regions and individual constituencies, relative to the level
of constituency changes involved, with these scores ranging between 1.0 (denoting
no changes being made to a constituency boundary) and 6.0 depending on the
level of boundary amendments involved. Averaging out these constituency KICC
scores for the last eight boundary revisions, as illustrated in Figure 3, proves the con-
tention that the latest set of boundary revisions have had by far the most impact since
those brought about in the 1980 report. To some extent, this need not be surprising.
Whereas seat levels increased from 148 to 166 in the 1980 revisions, Da´il seat
numbers stayed at 166 across the following six revisions, until they were reduced
158 in the 2012 Constituency Commission report. As Figure 3 illustrates, the
KICC score of 3.38 for the 2012 revisions shows that the extent of these changes
far outstripped those of the preceding six revisions (most of which register KICC
scores close to the 2.0 level). The extent of the 2012 revisions, however, paled in
comparison with those registered for the 1980 report (with an associated KICC
score of 4.19).
Variations in KICC scores can be explained in terms of the 1980 revisions having
effectively set the template that would shape boundary configurations across the fol-
lowing six boundary reports, and most of the constituencies set in place by that report
were still in place when the 2007 report was published (Constituency Commission,
1980). When new constituencies did emerge, these tended to be the result of amalga-
mations of constituencies that were in place at the time of the 1980 report, as in the
case of the Mayo East and Mayo West constituencies, or the disaggregating of exist-
ing constituencies as transpired in the case of the old Kildare and Meath constituen-
cies. Dublin Mid-West was probably the only ‘truly new’ constituency created during
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this period, having emerged in the 1998 revisions from the amalgamating of parts of
the Dublin South-West and Dublin West constituencies. The 2012 revisions have
involved significant changes to the boundary template set in place by the 1980
report, however, with the replacing of a number of constituencies created in this
report, or prior to it, by a number of new constituency units. Barring further changes
to the overall number of Da´il seats (which would necessitate a constitutional change
in the case of a further reduction in Da´il seat numbers) or very dramatic changes to
the state’s population geography, the 2012 report is likely to act as the template on
which the next series of boundary revisions will be based, and indeed some of the rec-
ommendations in this report would appear to have been made with further revisions in
mind. For instance, the creation of the five-seat Tipperary and Donegal constituencies
and the three-seat Laois and Offaly constituencies involved breaches of county bound-
aries that could be redressed in further commission reports if current demographic
trends continue and bring these county populations in line with the levels required to
allow for an exact match between the county and Da´il constituency boundaries.
Figure 3 also shows that there is an underlying geography involved with these
KICC scores, with demographic trends across the state over the three past decades
dictating that certain areas and regions were more likely to be affected by boundary
changes. A comparison between the KICC scores for the Dublin region and the rest of
Figure 3. Level of boundary amendments associated with constituency commission
reports 1980–2012 as measured by Kavanagh index of constituency change (KICC scores)
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the state shows that, for a number of these revisions, the extent of boundary changes
in Dublin has been considerably larger than in the rest of the state, although the score
for the rest of the state was somewhat larger for the 2004 revision (in which several
new constituencies were created, including the new Meath East and Meath West
three-seaters). At the constituency level, even more extreme variations are to be
observed in terms of the average scores registered across the eight boundary revisions
involved in the period 1980–2012, as illustrated by Table A1. The constituency
registering the highest KICC score across this period was Dublin West (4.08), the
only constituency whose boundaries have been changed in each of the boundary revi-
sions in this period. A number of other Dublin constituencies also figure among those
experiencing the highest level of boundary changes in this period, including Dublin
South-Central, Dublin Mid-West, Dublin South-West, Dublin Fingal (North) and
Dublin Rathdown (South). Roscommon, or rather the different constituencies that
have included the county of Roscommon across this period, including Roscommon,
Longford-Roscommon, Roscommon-South Leitrim and Roscommon-Galway, has
the highest KICC score of the non-Dublin constituencies, with high scores also
being associated with Galway East and Kildare North. At the other end of the
scale, the constituencies with the lowest KICC scores were Carlow-Kilkenny and
Waterford, two constituencies whose boundaries have remained unaffected by
most of the boundary reports produced during this period, with low KICC scores
also being associated with the Wexford, Cork South-West and Cavan-Monaghan
constituencies.
These KICC score figures are useful as boundary changes also have an impact on
ordinary voters and on areas. The high degree of localism associated with Irish poli-
tics means that the boundary changes will have an impact particularly on places,
given the perception that areas or counties have that it is important to be represented
in Da´il E´ireann by a representative from the same local area or the same county. But
boundary changes may also demobilise populations in the affected areas, if they
cannot recognise any of the political representatives in their new constituency or if
they are left confused as to which constituency they now find themselves located
in following such changes. The geography of KICC scores points in particular to
areas, or constituencies, that are especially prone to regular boundary revisions.
Such regular boundary changes can demotivate voters from participating in elections
in that these will increase the costs of voting in requiring voters to gather information
on the different politicians and political issues that will face them in a new constitu-
ency, sometimes following each series of boundary amendments. It is perhaps not
entirely coincidental that a number of constituencies with higher KICC scores tend
also to rank among the constituencies with the lowest voter turnout levels nationally.
Research on the low-turnout South-West Inner City (Dublin) area found that local
respondents believed that an ‘ongoing . . . never-ending cascade of changes’ to elec-
toral boundaries in the local area played a role in causing low participation levels in
this area, while also pointing to instances where local people arrived at their polling
stations to find that the people standing for election in their constituency were differ-
ent from whom they were expecting (Kavanagh, 2002a, 2002b).
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Concluding Considerations
The process of ratifying the Constituency Commission report is (as of February 2013)
ongoing, but there has been little in the way of serious opposition to the proposed
changes expressed in the Da´il debates on the 2012 Electoral Act that will put them
into effect. This contrasts with the highly contentious debate in the United
Kingdom concerning proposed changes to general election boundaries and parlia-
ment seats levels there, as attested to in a House of Lords debate on the proposed
boundaries:
Despair and anxiety have become the hallmarks of many a political household
in the land. While spouses fret, long-term political friendships have become
clouded in suspicion. There is an overwhelming feeling of injustice among
Britain’s MPs, many of whom have spent decades building up relationships
with their constituents. At the stroke of a commissioner’s pen their lives,
careers, family ties, political organisations and loyalties are to be disrupted,
leading to widespread insecurity. It is all so unfair. (Lord Campbell-Savours,
2012)
While the process for redrawing electoral boundaries in Ireland mirrors that of the
United Kingdom (which uses a first-past-the-post electoral system) – and differs radi-
cally from the process in other European countries, which use proportional electoral
systems – the process for ensuring equality of representation across different consti-
tuencies has proved to be a much more rigorous one in Ireland (Borisyuk et al., 2010).
In the United Kingdom, prior to the 2010 Parliamentary Voting System and Consti-
tuencies Bill, concerns in relation to ensuring equality of representation aimed to keep
variations between constituencies ‘within tolerable limits’, although the extent of the
toleration involved generally remained undefined and continuity and community pro-
visions were generally awarded greater precedence (Johnston et al., 2001: 86). The
2010 Bill effectively would have brought this process more in line with the Irish
approach, with stricter rules relating to equality of representation provisions and an
increased frequency of boundary reviews along the same lines as the Irish process
(Rossiter et al., 2012), in addition to a reduction in the numbers to be elected to
the House of Commons from 650 to 600. But, while the Electoral Acts putting Con-
stituency Commission reviews into effect are always passed through the Da´il with
very few amendments (usually minor changes, such as amendments to constituency
names), if any, this has not proved to be the case in the United Kingdom, and follow-
ing votes in the Houses of Lords and Commons it has been decided to suspend the
implementation of the proposed boundary changes there until after the next general
election. Despite the problems and issues surrounding contemporary Irish politics
and its history of partisan gerrymanders, it is somewhat heartening that Irish poli-
ticians are willing to implement the recommendations of an independent commission
without significant change, even when these may well be putting their own political
futures at risk.
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As noted above, the Irish boundary review process is different from the approach
employed by most other European countries using proportional electoral systems. In
a number of these cases, fixed constituency areas equating to existing administrative
units are used and the only changes that may occur involve the periodic reassigning of
seat numbers on a proportional basis to these constituency units, mainly on the basis
of population levels but sometimes also taking account of constituency area and
population density concerns (Coakley, 2007). Coakley (2008) has argued that the
application of a similar apportionment system could be appropriate to the Irish
context. In this case, the constituency boundaries could be fixed on the basis of
administrative county boundaries (or an amalgamation of them for smaller counties
such as Sligo and Leitrim) and equality of representation would be assured by period-
ically adjusting seat numbers between constituencies in line with population changes,
thus removing the need for long, arduous and administratively demanding boundary
redrawal processes following the publication of each census. In this case, he argues,
the reapportioning of seats by constituency would merely demand a half hour’s work
on the part of a numerate civil servant, and the use of fixed constituency units would
relieve politicians and voters from the various uncertainties and stresses involved in
each boundary revision, as discussed earlier. A change to a process such as this would
require changes to be made in terms of the range of seat numbers that can be chosen
from for the purpose of allocating these to general election constituencies, but this
could be accommodated by means of a change to the Electoral Act.
To conclude, it can be argued that the ‘where’ matters in electoral politics and
especially in Irish electoral politics, given its strong localistic dimensions and tra-
dition of geographical, or ‘friends and neighbours’, voting. Constituency boundaries,
and the redrawing of these, is a key element defining the ‘where’ of Irish politics and
boundary changes do have an impact on political contests at the national level, but
especially at the local, or constituency, level. The significant changes brought
about in the 2012 Constituency Commission report – reducing Da´il seat numbers
by eight and encompassing a range of boundary amendments that involve the
majority of existing Da´il constituencies – will notably alter the Irish political land-
scape in the lead-up to the next general election. The boundary changes also have
the potential to affect the success levels of new political reform initiatives, such as
the gender quota legislation, and indeed it could also be argued that boundary revi-
sions, or changes in the approach taken to them, could play a role in facilitating
these and number of other political reform initiatives. But just as contentions that
the Republic of Ireland has too many members of parliament cannot be addressed
without the holding of a referendum, other changes to the terms of reference set
for Constituency Commissions will require changes in legislation and amendments
of the existing Electoral Acts. One aspect that could be focused on is the limitations
placed on Constituency Commissions in terms of the range of Da´il constituency seat
numbers they can award to constituencies. The relatively small district magnitude
associated with Irish election constituencies limits the degree of proportionality
associated with the system and ‘ensures that the large parties gain and the small
ones lose consistently’ in this regard (Gallagher, 1986: 259), but this is also a
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concern given the evidence that larger constituencies can act to facilitate the electoral
participation levels of female candidates, in addition to those from minority groups.
Thus, it is important that the topic of electoral boundaries should also form a part of
political reform discourse in the Republic of Ireland over the coming years and the
Irish parliament be prepared to enact legislative change where it is deemed desirable
to change the rules shaping the redrawing of election boundaries in order better to
facilitate political reform processes.
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Appendix: The Kavanagh Index of Constituency Change
The KICC produces KICC scores for each boundary revision, as well as for specific
regions and individual constituencies, relative to the level of constituency changes
involved, with these scores ranging between 1.0 (denoting no changes being made
to a constituency boundary) and 6.0 depending on the level of boundary amendments
involved. Constituencies in which no boundary revisions have taken place in a par-
ticular Constituency Commission review are allocated a score of 1.0. The constitu-
ency KICC scores are weighted by a factor of 3.0 if a new constituency has been
created in the process or if that constituency loses or gains at least one seat. The
new constituency weighting was reduced to 1.00 in cases where the creation of a
new constituency effectively amounted to the renaming of an existing constituency
and where the territory/population transfers involved proved to be quite limited
(less than 10,000 population). The score is weighted further by a factor of between
1.5 and 3.0 depending on the level of population transfers involved if territory is
being gained and/or lost by a constituency. Minor changes, where the combined
total level of population being moved into, and out of, the constituency arising
from the different boundary changes having an impact on this is less than 5,000.
This weighting increases to:
1. 2.0 for changes involving between 5,000 and 10,000 population;
2. 2.2 for changes involving between 10,000 and 15,000 population;
3. 2.4 for changes involving between 15,000 and 20,000 population;
4. 2.6 for changes involving between 20,000 and 25,000 population;
5. 2.8 for changes involving between 25,000 and 30,000 population;
6. 3.0 for changes involving greater than 30,000 population.
The individual scores for each constituency are then averaged out to produce the
overall average KICC score associated with specific Constituency Commission reports.
KICC scores for the individual constituencies across the eight Constituency Com-
mission reports published since 1980 have been averaged out to produce an overall
estimate for each of these, as noted in Table A1. The constituency units used here
are those that were in existence on more than half, at least, of the occasions on
which these reports were published.
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Table A1. KICC scores by Da´il constituency, averaged across the 1980, 1983, 1990, 1995,
1998, 2004, 2007 and 2012 boundary revisions
Constituency Average KICC score
Carlow-Kilkenny 1.19
Cavan-Monaghan 1.59
Clare 1.65
Cork East 1.68
Cork North-Central 2.74
Cork North-West 2.24
Cork South-Central 2.65
Cork South-West 1.50
Donegal North-East 2.23
Donegal South-West 2.23
Dublin Central 2.71
Dublin Mid-West 3.25
Dublin North (Fingal) 3.15
Dublin North-Central 2.90
Dublin North-East 3.06
Dublin North-West 2.70
Dublin South (Rathdown) 3.10
Dublin South-Central 3.56
Dublin South-East (Dublin Bay South) 2.58
Dublin South-West 3.21
Dublin West 4.08
Du´n Laoghaire 2.50
Galway East 3.03
Galway West 2.09
Kerry North 2.28
Kerry South 1.91
Kildare North 3.01
Kildare South 2.73
Laois-Offaly 1.66
Limerick City/Limerick East 2.39
Limerick County/Limerick West 2.43
Longford-Westmeath 2.33
Louth 1.61
Mayo 2.34
Meath East 2.45
Meath West 2.38
Roscommon-(South Leitrim/Longford/East Galway) 3.09
Sligo-Leitrim 2.76
(Continued )
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Table A1. (Continued).
Constituency Average KICC score
Tipperary North 1.91
Tipperary South 2.65
Waterford 1.19
Wexford 1.44
Wicklow 2.18
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